This paper presents a new distinguisher which can be applied to secret-prefix MACs with the message length prepended to the message before hashing. The new distinguisher makes use of a special truncated differential path with high probability to distinguish an inner near-collision in the first round. Once the inner near-collision is detected, we can recognize an instantiated MAC from a MAC with a random function. The complexity for distinguishing the MAC with 43-step reduced SHA-1 is 2 124.5 queries. For the MAC with 61-step SHA-1, the complexity is 2 154.5 queries. The success probability is 0.70 for both.
Introduction
Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms play an important role in internet security protocols (SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec) and the financial sector for debit and credit transaction. A MAC algorithm is a hash function with a secret key K as the secondary input, which guarantees data integrity and authenticity. The secret prefix method is a MAC construction which prepends a secret K to the message before the hashing operation, which is the basic design unit for HMAC/NMAC [1] . One suggestion to guarantee a secure secret prefix MAC is to prepend the message length to the message before hashing [13] . Recent work [2, 3, 15, 16, 17, 19] discovered devastating collision attacks on hash functions from the MDx family. Such attacks have undermined the confidence in the most popular hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1, and promoted the reevaluation of the actual security of the MAC algorithms based on them [4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 18] .
There are two kinds of distinguishing attacks on MACs, and they are respectively called distinguishing-R and distinguishing-H attacks [8] . Distinguishing-R attack means distinguishing a MAC from a random function, and distinguishing-H attack detects an instantiated MAC (by an underlying hash function or block cipher) from a MAC with a random function. Preneel and van Oorschot [10] introduced a general distinguishing-R attack on all iterated MACs using the birthday paradox, which requires about 2 n/2 messages and works with a success rate 0.63, where n is the length of the hash output. Their attack can immediately be converted into a general forgery attack. For the distinguishing-H attack, its ideal complexity should be exhaustive search cost.
This paper focuses on the distinguishing-H attack that checks which cryptographic hash function is embedded in a MAC. For simplicity, we call it distinguishing attack.
Kim et al. [8] described two kinds of distinguishers for the HMAC structure, which are differential and rectangle distinguishers. For the differential distinguisher, it needs a collision differential path with probability higher than 2 −n , and the rectangle distinguisher needs a near-collision differential with probability higher than 2 −n/2 . For MD4, because it is easy to find a differential path with high probability [15, 20] , there are some successful cryptanalytic results on MACs based on MD4 [4, 6, 14] . For HMAC/NMAC-MD5, there is only one available differential path that is called dBB pseudo-collision path [5] . Because the dBB pseudo-collision consists of two different IVs and the same message, so all the attacks [4, 6, 11, 14] are in the related-key setting. For HMAC/NMAC-SHA-0, there exists a partial key-recovery attack [4] . For HMAC-SHA-1, Kim et al. proposed a distinguishing attack on 43-step HMAC-SHA-1 with data complexity 2 154.9 , which was improved by Rechberger and Rijmen [12] . The improved attack detected 50-step HMAC-SHA-1 with data complexity 2 153.5 . The paper [12] also proposed a related-key distinguishing attack on 62-step (17-78) HMAC-SHA-1 and a full key-recovery attack on 34-step NMAC-SHA-1 in the related-key setting.
All the above attacks make use of collision or near-collision differential paths for the underlying compression function with probability higher than 2 −n . For MD5 and SHA-1, there are too many sufficient conditions in the collision or near-collision differential paths, which imply a complexity more than 2 n . Because most conditions focus on the first round, it is hard to analyze the MACs with MD5/SHA-1 for more steps without related keys. In this paper, we only consider the MACs with reduced SHA-1 starting from the first step.
One recent work [18] presented a new distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 and MD5-MAC without related keys. Their distinguisher detects an inner near-collision in the first iteration. This motivates us to explore a similar attack on MACs based on SHA-1. For the MAC with SHA-1, the situation is more complex, because SHA-1 dose not have a differential path with high probability. If we do not consider the first round, the probability of the existing differential paths for the last three rounds is high. How to avoid the differential path in the first round, and completely explore the probability advantage in the last three rounds? We neglect the exact path in the first round, replace it with an inner near-collision, and explore the new techniques to detect the inner near-collision by a birthday attack. Our new distinguishing attack is applicable to secret-prefix MACs with the length prepended before hashing, which is denoted as LPMAC.
For LPMAC based on 43-step SHA-1, the complexity is 2 124.5 queries, and for LPMAC with 61-step SHA-1, the complexity is 2 154.5 . This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives brief descriptions of LP-MAC and SHA-1. In Section 3, we present the new distinguisher which is available to LPMAC structure, and describe the details of the distinguishing attack on LPMAC with 61-step SHA-1 in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Backgrounds and Definitions
In this section, we define the notations used in this paper, and give brief descriptions of the LPMAC and SHA-1.
Notations
H : a hash function H : a hash function without padding and length appending n : the length of the hash output b
: the length of one message block IV : the initial chaining value x y : the concatenation of the two bitstrings x and y x i,j : the j-th bit of x i , where x i is a 32-bit word, j = 1, . . . , 32, and 32 is the most significant bit +, − : addition and subtration modular 2 32 ∆ − x : modular difference x − x ′ , where x and x ′ are two 32-bit words ∧, ¬, ∨, ⊕ : bitwise AND, NOT, OR and exclusive OR ≪ s : left-rotation operation by s-bit
MAC using Secret Prefix Method
The secret prefix method is to append a message M to a secret key K before the hashing operation:
where H is an unkeyed hash function. This method was proposed in the 1980s, and suggested for MD4 independently in [7, 13] . The original secret prefix MAC is insecure: given a message and its MAC, an attacker can easily append another message to the message and update the MAC accordingly, as the given MAC value can be taken as the initial chaining value for the appended message [10] . Prefixing the message length to the message before hashing is one suggestion to avoid the above attack [13] . However, our new distinguisher specifically works for this kind of MAC, which we call LPMAC. We provide that K #length pad is a full block, and this kind of MAC corresponds to a hash function H with a secret IV (K ′ ), which is denoted as:
In the rest of this paper, LPMAC refers to a MAC with the new form H K ′ (M ).
Brief Description of SHA-1
The hash function SHA-1 was issued by NIST in 1995 as a Federal Information Processing Standard [9] . It follows the Merkle-Damgård iterative construction, takes a message M with the bit-length less than 2 64 , and produces a 160-bit digest. The compression function takes a 160-bit chaining value h i = (a 0 , b 0 , c 0 , d 0 , e 0 ) and a 512-bit message block M i as inputs, and produces another 160-bit chaining value h i+1 , where h 0 is the initial value IV , and M = M 0 · · · M t−1 . By iterating all the message blocks M i , we obtain the final 160bit value h t which is the hash value.
Each 512-bit block M i is divided into sixteen 32-bit words, which is denoted as (m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m 15 ). The message words are expanded to eighty 32-bit words w 0 , . . . , w 79 :
The compression function consists of 4 rounds, and each round includes 20 steps. The details for the compression function are the following:
where the Boolean function f j and constant k j are described in Table 1 . 
New Distinguisher on LPMAC Structure
This section introduces a new distinguisher of the LPMAC structure. It is based on a near-collision differential path with two message blocks.
Recent Attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 and MD5-MAC [18]
We first recall the distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 and MD5-MAC presented in [18] . This distinguisher utilizes the dBB pseudo-collision path of MD5 [5] , where the hash values collide with probability 2 −46 when the IV difference satisfies the dBB-condition, i.e.,
where (A 0 , B 0 , C 0 , D 0 ) = IV , and MSB means the most significant bit. To discard the related-key setting, and give a real distinguishing attack, the adversary firstly collects many one-block messages to guarantee enough pairs which produce a difference with the dBB-condition. Then append a fixed one-block message to the collected messages, query their MACs, and try to find out a dBB-collision. The main idea of the distinguishing attack is summarized as follows:
To maintain the appearance of a dBB-collision under the dBB-condition, i. e., the dBB pseudo-collision happens in the second iteration, the adversary selects a structure S composed of 2 89 one-block messages P . Then a fixed 447bit message M is appended to each P ∈ S. Query the MACs with all P M , and find all collision pairs (P M, P ′ M ) by birthday attack. A dBB -collision is detected as follows. Once a dBB-collision is detected, it is concluded that the MAC is a MAC based on MD5, otherwise, based on a random function.
Description of the New Distinguisher
Our attack is motivated by the above idea, which is to distinguish an instantiated LPMAC from a random function by detecting the target inner near-collision. However, our distinguisher is a totally different one. All the previous attacks detect the collision (or near-collision) generated by a full iteration of the hash function [4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 18] , but our attack is trying to distinguish an inner nearcollision occurring in the first round, and there is no published techniques to detect such a near-collision till now.
For SHA-1 reduced to 61 steps, we consider a differential path with two message blocks, and assume that P M 0 M 1 and P ′ M ′ 0 ||M ′ 1 are a message pair, which produces a target differential path. Here, P and P ′ are one-block messages, M 0 and M ′ 0 are 448-bit (14 words) truncated messages of the second block, and M 1 and M ′ 1 are the corresponding 64-bit messages left. Denote the output of the first iteration H K (P ) as h P , H K (P ′ ) as h ′ P , and suppose the intermediate chaining variables (a i , · · · , e i ) of the second block as ch i , and (a ′ i , · · · , e ′ i ) as ch ′ i . It is clear that h P + ch 61 and h ′ P + ch ′ 61 are hash values of the message pair. We select a target differential path, such that the first iteration can be any differential path, and the second includes a near-collision differential path. To make the truncated differential path of the last 47 steps with high probability, we choose the same disturbance vector as [16] , which produces the near-collision differential path for the second iteration (See Table 2 ). We divide the second differential path into two parts, the first part consists of the previous 14 steps which involves most conditions, and the second part is the last 47 steps with only 34 conditions. We neglect the special differential path in previous 14 steps, and only consider its output difference, which can be regarded as an inner nearcollision. We select the specific difference △ch 14 = ch 14 ⊕ ch ′ 14 as (0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x80000000, 0x20000002, 0x00000040).
The choice of △ch 14 is to cancel the message word differences △w 14 and △w 15 . The sufficient conditions for the cancelation are as follows: a 10,9 = w 14,7 + 1, a 11,4 = w 15,2 + 1, a 11,32 = w 14,30 , a 13,2 = 1, a 13,30 = 0, a 13,32 = 1, a 13,4 = w 14,2 + w 16,2 + 1, a 14,4 = w 14,2 + w 16,2 , a 14,32 = 0.
The core of our attack is to explore some mathematical properties that can be used to distinguish the inner near-collision in the 14th step. For the LPMAC, there are two obstacles to do this:
1. In the first iteration, the output difference ∆ − H P = H P − H ′ P is unknown, which conceals the difference of the near-collision ∆ − H P + ∆ − ch 61 . Hence, the birthday attack can not be applied directly to the second iteration like the distinguishing attacks on MACs based on MD5. 2. How to choose messages, and fulfill the birthday attack to detect the inner near-collision?
We explore the following mathematical properties of the differential path to surpass the above two obstacles:
result in the near-collision differential path, i. e., then we have (See Fig. 1 .)
We utilize the equation (2) to construct a distinguisher for LPMAC with 61-step SHA-1.
• Firstly, collect enough messages
and their MACs. Compute two structures, one structure is
and the other is
• Secondly, apply the birthday attack to the structures S 1 and S 2 , and search all the collisions such that
• Finally, for each collision, detect whether the corresponding pair (P M 0 M 1 , P ′ M ′ 0 M ′ 1 ) satisfies the differential path in Table 2 . More details about the distinguisher are described in the following section. It is noted that, it is hard to fulfill the birthday attack directly to search the solution to equation (1), but easy to get the solution to equation (2) by birthday attack. 4 New Distinguishing Attack on LPMAC Based on 61-step SHA-1
In this section, we describe the new distinguishing attack in detail. We assume that the LPMAC algorithm is either LPMAC with 61-step SHA-1 or LPMAC with a random function. Before we introduce the new attack, we need to make clear that how many chosen messages are needed to guarantee an inner near-collision. The total sufficient conditions for the near-collision is 169, where 160 conditions are from the difference △ch 14 , and 9 conditions (See Subsection 3.2) are deduced from the cancelation of △w 14 and △w 15 . So, we need 2 169/2 = 2 84.5 messages to guarantee such an inner near-collision happen.
Select four messages
are consistent with the target message difference in Table 2 , and M 0 M 1 , M 0 N 1 satisfy the sufficient conditions in Table 3 .
The distinguishing attack implements the following four steps: 1. Randomly choose a structure S, which consists of 2 84.5 different one-block messages. 2. For all P ∈ S, query the MACs with P M 0 M 1 , P M ′ 0 M ′ 1 , P M 0 N 1 and P M ′ 0 N ′ 1 , respectively, and compute the following two structures of differences
Search all the collisions between two structures by a birthday attack.
For each collision, compute LP M AC(P M
, and denote it as δ. Then for the message pair (P M 0 , P ′ M ′ 0 ), we choose 2 34 different message pairs (M 1 , M ′ 1 ) such that M 0 M 1 satisfies the message sufficient conditions for the near-collision path in Table 3 . Query the MACs
) that matches the difference δ is searched, we conclude that the LPMAC is based on 61-step SHA-1, and stop the algorithm.
-Else, go to step 4. 4. Repeat steps 1-3. If the number of structures exceeds 2 68 , we conclude that the LPMAC is constructed from a random function.
Complexity:
Summing up the above attack, we choose 4·2 68 ·(2 84.5 +2 34 ) ≈ 2 154.5 messages in total. Since we can use the birthday attack to search collisions in step 2, a table with size of 2 84.5 needs to be built. We need about 2 68 · 2 84.5 = 2 152.5 table lookups and 2 154.5 queries.
Success rate:
From the above process, the success rate of our attack can be divided into two parts :
-If the LPMAC is constructed from 61-step SHA-1, once a second collision in step 3 is detected, the attack succeeds. The probability is computed as follows:
• There are 169 conditions to guarantee the inner near-collision in the step 14, and 34 conditions to follow the differential path in the last steps 15-61. According to the birthday paradox and Taylor series expansion, for 2 68 · 2 169 = 2 237 pairs among the structures S 1 and S 2 , there exists an inner near-collision with probability 1 − (1 − 1 2 237 ) 2 237 ≈ 1 − e −1 ≈ 0.63.
• If the first collision is captured in step 2, the second collision in step 3 is searched with probability 1 − (1 − 1 2 34 ) 2 34 ≈ 1 − e −1 ≈ 0.63.
Hence, when the LPMAC is based on 61-step SHA-1, the distinguishing attack successes with probability 0.63 · 0.63 ≈ 0.40 . -If the LPMAC is from a random function, the attack succeeds when the second collision doesn't exist. For the 2 68 structures, there are 2 237 /2 160 = 2 77 expected collisions in total, so the success probability is about:
Therefore, the success rate of the whole attack is about 1 2 × 0.40 + 1 2 × 1 = 0.70.
Note that the success probability can be increased by repeating this attack several times, doubling the size of the structure S or the number of different pairs (M 1 , M ′ 1 ). Table 4 illustrates the comparison of our distinguishing attacks on LPMAC-SHA-1 with other attacks on HMAC-SHA-1. 
Conclusions
A new distinguisher is introduced to recognize the secret-prefix MAC which prepends the message length before hashing. The new distinguisher utilizes a near-collision differential path instead of a collision path, and detects an inner near-collision in the first round. The core of the attack is to capture the mathematical characters of a near-collision differential path which can be utilized to fulfill a birthday attack. Our attack is applicable to some other LPMACs such as LPMAC with reduced SHA-2.
